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Nature of the Case 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in State v. Orellana-Castro, 2014, Opinion No. 71 (Ct. App. September 2, 2014) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). The State asserts that the Court of Appeals incorrectly 
interpreted I.C.R. 8(a). However, Mr. Orellana-Castro continues to assert that the 
district court erred in allowing the charges involving G.O. to be joined with the charges 
involving S.0. and in failing to sever the charges. Consequently, he asserts that the 
Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in failing to sever the charges. 
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Additionaily, because review was granted "as to the issues presented in this 
appeal," Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion for a mistrial after it was brought to the district court's attention that 
the court appointed interpreter was knowingly providing inaccurate and incomplete 
interpretation of defense witnesses. Further, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it did not allow Mr. Orellana-Castro to present 
evidence that another individual caused G.O.'s psychological injuries pursuant to I.RE. 
412. Finally, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts even if this Court finds that the errors 
individually were harmless, that they cumulatively deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On December 7, 2011, an Information was filed charging Mr. Orellana-Castro 
with four counts of sex abuse (two involving alleged victim G.O. and two involving 
alleged victim S.O.) and two counts of lewd conduct involving alleged victim G.O. 
(R., pp.69-72.) Mr. Orellana-Castro entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.73.) 
A Motion for Leave to Offer Evidence of [G.O.]'s Reputation Pursuant to Rules 
405 and 412 was filed asserting that credibility would be an issue at trial and in order to 
attack G.O.'s credibility the defense would need to offer evidence regarding G.O.'s 
veracity, some of which may touch on past sexual behaviors. (R., pp.114-115.) The 
State opposed the motion asserting that the 412 evidence was not admissible under the 
rule. (R., pp.130-131.) After a hearing on the motion, it was determined that evidence 
concerning "the sexual behavior of G.O. would not be admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 412 
and that the defense was free to offer general evidence of reputation of G.O. for truth 
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and honesty without evidence of specific incidences, including the sexual behavior of 
G.O." (R., p.153.) 
Mr. Orellana-Castro also filed a Motion to Sever and Motion for Relief from 
Prejudicial Joinder. (R., pp.112-113.) The motion noted that the charges were 
prejudicially joined because the alleged offenses occurred at different times and places, 
were totally unrelated, involved different alleged victims, do not show a common plan or 
scheme, and do not serve to establish any exceptions under I.R.E. Rule 404(b) for 
admission of other crime, wrong or act evidence in the other cause if the cases were 
severed. (R., pp.112-113.) The State opposed the motion to sever, noting that the 
alleged crimes were part of a common scheme or plan to have sexual contact with his 
step-daughters and that their testimony would act to corroborate each other. 
(R., pp.132-133.) In denying the motion, the court found that "the charged acts of the 
defendant where sufficient to satisfy the showing of a common plan or scheme and that 
there was no undue prejudice and that any prejudice could be mitigated by the jury 
instructions." (R., pp.153-154.) 
The case then proceeded to trial. (R., p.241.) The State's first witness was 
Yolanda Orozco, the alleged victims' aunt. (Tr., p.287, L.9 - p.288, L.9.) Yolanda 
Orozco testified that S.O. lived with her and S.O.'s grandparents, staying for periods 
longer than a week before returning to her mother and step-father's home, and that this 
had been her living arrangement since S.O. was approximately four or five years old. 
(Tr., p.288, L.1 - p.289, L.18.) On one of the nights that S.O. was staying at her 
grandparent's house, she was crying and Yolanda decided to ask her what was wrong; 
in asking her several questions about what was bothering S.O., Yolanda became 
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concerned that the issue was that Mr. Orellana-Castro was touching S.O. 
inappropriately. (Tr., p.294, L6 - p.295, L.21.) The next day Yolanda went to the Crisis 
Center with her sister Silvia, S.O.'s mother, and some of Silvia's other children. 
(Tr., p.297, Ls.3-20.) 
S.O. was the next witness. She testified that in 2011 she awoke in the family car 
on the way home from Twin Falls and found Mr. Orellana-Castro's hand on her breast. 
(Tr., p.312, Ls.10-16.) In the summer of 2010, S.O. went into Mr. Orellana-Castro's 
bedroom to get her phone back, he held the phone tight, grabbed her arm, pulled her 
into the bed, pulled the covers over her, and then teasingly asked her, "What's this?", 
referring to the part of her swimsuit that was showing from under her clothes, the tie 
near the neck. (Tr., p.315, L.8 - p.316, L.8.) She told him it was her swimsuit and that 
he needed to let her go, he said her friend could wait, she then elbowed him, got loose, 
and left the house with her brother to go to the water park. (Tr., p.316, Ls.7-16.) At that 
time, Mr. Orellana-Castro was only wearing his boxers. (Tr., p.317, Ls.19-21.) S.O. 
believed that Mr. Orellana-Castro was trying to untie her swimsuit. (Tr., p.318, Ls.4-7.) 
S.O. also testified about another time that something happened in Mr. Orellana-
Castro's bedroom. (Tr., p.319, L.15 - p.321, L.14.) She said that when she was five, 
she was playing hide and seek and was in Mr. Orellana-Castro's bedroom hiding when 
he came in. He then locked the door, carried her on to the bed, tried to take off her 
shirt, and then started hugging her. (Tr., p.320, Ls.8-23.) G.O. was looking for S.O. 
and started looking under the door so Mr. Orellana-Castro hid S.O. by the bed and told 
her to tell G.O. that she had been hiding there. (Tr., p.321, Ls.1-8.) Later, S.O. 
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changed her testimony and stated that Mr. Orellana-Castro took off her top during the 
incident. (Tr., p.378, Ls.3-22.) 
The State then presented the testimony of Deysi Orozco, the girls' aunt, who 
testified about her general involvement in the case after she learned that something 
inappropriate may be going on, including confronting the girls' mother, Silvia. 
(Tr., p.381, L.17 - p.395, L.2) Tania Nelson, the mother of one of G.O.'s friends, 
testified that information was disclosed to her by G.O. and that she informed G.O.'s 
school counselor about what G.O. had told her. (Tr., p.395, L.19 - p.400, L.9.) 
Sergeant Rickey Cowen testified about his involvement in investigating the case, 
primarily discussing his interviews of both G.O. and S.O. at Valley School. (Tr., p.407, 
L.1 -- p.427, L.10.) 
The State presented the testimony of several witnesses who provided counseling 
or mental health assessments for G.O. The first of such witnesses was Joan Kauffman. 
(Tr., p.439, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Kauffman began her testimony by discussing how forensic 
interviews are conducted and what normal behavior is for children that have been 
abused, specifically in regards to the way they disclose the abuse. (Tr., p.440, L.14 -
p.448, L.13.) Ms. Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. at CARES and had G.O. 
complete a trauma screening checklist. (Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9.) G.O.'s results 
showed that she had "very high" anxiety and depression, some anger, worry about 
someone killing her, a bit of "suicide worry," a lot of sexual preoccupation, and "very 
high" sexual distress. (Tr., p.458. Ls.2-9.) CARES referred G.O. for counseling, made 
a mental health referral, and encouraged her to "get some medication for her 
depression." (Tr., p.471, Ls.9-17.) 
5 
Dr. Rick Yuvruian, a psychiatrist with St. Luke's Behavioral Heath, completed a 
standard psychiatric evaluation of G.O. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-25.) Dr. Yuvruian diagnosed 
G.O. with depression not otherwise specified and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
(Tr., p.503, Ls.14-·17, p.507, Ls.14-22.) Eric Call, a licensed clinical social worker, 
completed a mental health assessment on G.O. (Tr., p.534, Ls.1-23.) He diagnosed 
G.O. with major depression, severe with psychotic features, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder. (Tr., p.536, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Call determined that the trauma related to the 
PTSD diagnosis was the reported sexual abuse by her step-father and that no other 
trauma was reported to him. (Tr., p.542, Ls.4-8.) Jason Beard, a therapist with 
Preferred Child and Family Services, discussed general symptoms and issues that 
people who are the victims of sexual abuse deal with. (Tr., p.650, L.20 - p.654, L.21.) 
G.O. was referred to him to discuss her reported sexual abuse and related issues. 
(Tr., p.654, L.22 - p.655, L.8.) 
G.O. testified that in January of 2011, Mr. Orellana-Castro came into her room, 
grabbed her, took off her clothes, touched her all over including her chest, and put his 
fingers and penis into her vagina. (Tr., p.558, L.1 - p.562, L.5.) G.O. did not tell 
anyone about this incident right away because she was scared. (Tr., p.563, L.23 -
p.564, L.5.) In July of 2010, G.O. went into Mr. Orellana-Castro's bedroom to look for 
her brother. Once inside, Mr. Orellana-Castro closed and locked the door, threw her 
onto the bed, took off her clothes, touched her breast and legs, sucked on her breasts, 
and put his penis into her vagina and anus. (Tr., p.564, L.6 - p.567, L.11.) G.0. told 
her mother about what had happened; Silvia and Mr. Orellana-Castro got into a fight, 
but nothing came from it. (Tr., p.574, L.21 - p.575, L.5.) Later, in August of 2011, she 
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also told her Aunt Oeysi who talked to G.O.'s mother about her concerns and the family 
left to stay at the Crisis Center, but it was later decided that Mr. Orellana-Castro would 
just stay in the garage and leave them alone. (Tr., p.575, L.9 p.579, L.23.) Her last 
disclosure was to Ms. Nelson in October 2011, immediately prior to Mr. Orellana-Castro 
being charged. (Tr., p.572, L.2 - p.573, L.4) On cross-examination, G.O. discussed 
that her biological father and her mother had an abusive relationship and that she 
witnessed her mother being abused as a very young child. (Tr., p.588, L.17 - p.590, 
L.21.) 
The State also presented the testimony of Kerry Koontz, the CARES employee 
who completed an evaluation of S.O. (Tr., p.638, L.4 - p.640, L.24.) The trauma 
symptom checklist completed after the interview did not raise any concerns, but it was 
recommended that S.O. complete counseling. (Tr., p.645, L.9 - p.646, L.5.) 
At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel requested that a directed 
verdict be entered on Count V, the incident involving S.O. being pulled onto the bed, 
because the evidence presented did not show any sexual touching or that the actions 
were completed with the requisite intent. (Tr., p.675, L.19 - p.678, L.13.) The motion 
was denied. (Tr., p.678, L.14 - p.680, L.5.) 
Mr. Orellana-Castro called several witness. Deborah Gabardi, executive director 
of the Crisis Center, testified that she keeps the records for the Crisis Center and 
supplied the relevant information necessary to allow for the admission of Defendant's 
Exhibit 201, a Resident Update Sheet completed when Silvia came to the center. 
(Tr., p.688, L.1 - p.693, L.10.) Ms. Nelson was re-called and testified that G.O. told her 
that the abuse by Mr. Orellana-Castro had been going on since November of 2010. 
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(Tr., p.701, L.16- p.704, L.13.) Mr. Jeremy Sudik testified that Mr. Orellana-Castro was 
a good employee and had a reputation for being truthful. (Tr., p.752, L.·1 - p.754, L.22.) 
Ms. Maria Orozco, the grandmother of the alleged victims, testified that when 
Silvia and the girls' biological father lived together, he used drugs and was a heavy 
drinker. (Tr., p.712, L.19 - p.713, L.23.) She provided a history of when the family 
moved to Idaho and when Silvia met Mr. Orellana-Castro. (Tr., p.715, L.1 - p.717, 
L.25.) When the families lived in the same apartment complex, Ms. Orozco never saw 
anything out of the ordinary or improper between either Mr. Orellana-Castro and G.O. or 
S.O. (Tr., p.718, Ls.11-19.) She noted that Mr. Orellana-Castro appeared to devote 
himself to his family and was not a man who drank alcohol. (Tr., p.720, Ls.2-11.) 
Ms. Orozco noted that S.O. had lived with her off and on throughout her life and never 
said anything to her about being mistreated by Mr. Orellana-Castro. (Tr., p.720, L.16 -
p.723, L.5.) She then discussed G.O. and stated that G.O. was a problem child who 
gets in trouble, lies, says things that are not true, and that she has always been that 
way. (Tr., p.724, L.3 - p.726, L.24.) She testified that she never saw anything related 
to the current charges and that, because G.O. told lies so often, she assumed that she 
was lying about the current charges as well. (Tr., p.730, Ls.1-15.) In the over ten years 
that Ms. Orozco has known Mr. Orellana-Castro she has always gotten along with him 
well, she believes he is a good person, a good father, and a well behaved person. 
(Tr., p.735, L.13-p.736, L.16, p.749, Ls.3-9.) 
Adan Coria testified that he is acquainted with Mr. Orellana-Castro and his 
family, that he believes that Mr. Orellana-Castro is a very good person, and that at the 
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Partida quinceanera he saw G.O. leave with a boy from the party. (Tr., p. 757, L.1 -
p.761, L.20.) 
At the start of the fifth day of the jury trial, defense counsel made a motion to 
make an offer of proof regarding past sexual behavior of G.O. (Tr., p.766, Ls.22-25.) 
Defense counsel stated that at the Partida quinceanera, G.O. had sex with a man 
named Jose. (Tr., p.767, Ls.8-12.) Jose had G.O. drink something that caused her to 
lose consciousness or be dizzy and G.O. did not understand what was happening. 
(Tr., p.767, Ls.13-17.) Although G.O. has always had problems in the past, those 
problems have magnified since the incident with Jose; her symptoms of anxiety, 
sleeplessness, anger, and so on have increased. (Tr., p.767, Ls.20-25.) Counsel 
wanted to discuss the sexual activity with Jose to offer an alternative explanation for 
G.O.'s psychological injury and the resulting effects. (Tr., p.768, Ls.11-14.) 
The State objected asserting that the injury contemplated by I.R.E. 412 is a 
physical injury. (Tr., p.769, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel responded that post traumatic 
stress disorder is an injury, that several State's experts testified that it is symptomatic in 
this case, that this evidence tends to explain why G.O. is suffering from these factors, 
and that this information is critical to the defense's case. (Tr., p.770, Ls.17-24.) 
The district court expressed some concern that the sexual contact with Jose was 
not "subsequent behavior," then determined that under I.R.E. 412, the injury must be a 
physical injury not an emotional injury, and noted that the appellate courts "have not 
held that the defense can create such a scenario to allow for the introduction of 412 
evidence." (Tr., p.773, L.8 - p.774, L.22.) 
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Defense counsel also raised concerns that the interpreter, Ernie Ha!e, was not 
providing a verbatim interpretation of the witnesses' testimony. (Tr., p. 775, L.18 -
p.776, L.9.) The interpreter, Mr. Hale, was then sworn and admitted that he did not 
provide an accurate, verbatim translation. (Tr., p.777, L.2 - p.778, L.7.) The interpreter 
was then asked by the district court if he promised to translate everything from now on 
verbatim; Mr. Hale responded that he would. (Tr., p.780, L.20 - p.781, L.1.) 
Defense counsel then asserted that he was being informed that the inaccurate 
interpretation had occurred on more than a couple of occasions. (Tr., p.781, Ls.2-7.) 
The district court then found that the interpreter testified under oath it only occurred on 
one or two occasions, and that the gist of Ms. Orozco's testimony was communicated to 
the jury. (Tr., p.781, Ls.8-23.) Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial. 
(Tr., p.783, L.16 - p.784, L.8.) The State objected. (Tr., p.784, L.10 - p.785, L.25.) 
The Court denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.786, L.8 - p.788, L.3.) 
Silvia Orellana, the alleged victim's mother, testified about her abusive marriage, 
that G.O. witnessed the abuse and was also physically abused. {Tr., p.793, L.8 -
p.797, L.10.) She noted that Mr. Orellana-Castro was not abusive and treated her well. 
(Tr., p.799, L.13 - p.800, L.7.) Ms. Orellana was sexually abused as a child and knew 
some symptoms of abuse and she did not ever see any signs that her children were 
being sexually abused. (Tr., p.805, L.5 - p.806, L.24.) She stated that she never saw 
any stains on the sheets or couch where the alleged abuse of G.O. had occurred. 
(Tr., p.808, L.23 - p.811, L.14.) Ms. Orellana testified that G.O. had a reputation of 
being a liar. (Tr., p.833, Ls.17-20.) Near the time of Mr. Orellana-Castro's arrest, a boy 
named Jose called for G.O.; after he called, Ms. Orellana had a conversation with G.O. 
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about the phone call, and G.O. made threats stating they would regret not giving her the 
telephone. (Tr., p.841, L.1 - p.843, L.23.) She also noted that quite a bit before 
Mr. Orellana-Castro's arrest, Silvia bought a pregnancy test for G.O. because she was 
concerned that, because of her relationships with other men, G.O. was pregnant. 
(Tr., p.879, L.1 -- p.880, L.7.) 
Dr. Ryan Roberts testified that he saw G.O. for abdominal pain in August of 2011 
and that he specifically asked G.O. if she was sexually active. (Tr., p.891, L.10 - p.895, 
L.11.) G.O. denied being sexually active. (Tr., p.895, Ls.3-5.) 
The defense's last witness was Mr. Orellana-Castro. Although he testified to a 
great deal of information, most notably, he denied any sexual contact with either G.O. or 
S.O. (Tr., p.916, L.19 - p.917, L.6, p.919, L.11 - 920, L.3, p.921, L.11 - p.923, L.14, 
p.928, L.16-p.930, L.21, p.936, Ls.16-25, p.944, L.21 - p.945, L.1, p.972, L.6- p.973, 
L.11.) Following Mr. Orellana-Castro's testimony, the defense rested. 
The State then called several rebuttal witnesses. Emily Gonzales testified that 
the narrative from the Crisis Center, Defendant's Exhibit 201, was a translation of what 
Silvia told her that day. (Tr., p.976, L.1 - p.980, L.9.) Brian Hardy testified that when 
G.O. had been sent to the office, she lied to try to get out of the situation, but no more 
than any other similarly situated student. (Tr., p.983, L.6 - p.985, L.20.) Fabian 
Orozco, Silvia's brother and the alleged victim's uncle, testified that about a year and a 
half ago, prior to Mr. Orellana-Castro being arrested, Silvia had told him about concerns 
that Mr. Orellana-Castro was acting inappropriately with G.O. (Tr., p.987, L.1 - p.991, 
L.10.) G.O. was recalled and testified that she had lied to her doctor about not being 
sexually active. (Tr., p.997, L.1 - p.1001, L.20.) S.O. was also recalled and stated that 
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she did not want to stay at the Crisis Center and that c;.o. and Mr. Oreilana-Castro did 
not get along very well. (Tr., p.1005, L.8 - p.1007, L.23.) The State then rested. 
(Tr., p.1011, Ls.21-23.) 
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Orellana-Castro of the four counts of sex abuse 
and the jury was unable to render a unanimous verdict on the two lewd conduct 
charges. (R., pp.384-385.) The district court later sentenced Mr. Orellana-Castro to a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, for each of the four counts of sex 
abuse, all sentences to run concurrently. (R., pp.469-475.) Mr. Orellana-Castro filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.484-
486.) 
On appeal, Mr. Orellana-Castro challenged the joinder of the charges related to 
S.O. to those related to G.O., the denial of a mistrial following inaccurate and 
incomplete interpretation of witnesses' testimony, the denial of Mr. Orellana-Castro's 
request to present evidence that G.O.'s psychological issues may have been the result 
of an uncharged sexual trauma, and that the errors amounted to harmless error. ( See 
generally, Appellant's Brief.) The Court of Appeals held that "the trial court erred by 
failing to sever the charges relating to S.O. from the charges relating to G.O. and that 
this error was not harmless." (Opinion, p.13.) The convictions were vacated and the 
case remanded to the district court. (Opinion, p.13.) The Court of Appeals did not 
address the interpreter issue because the convictions were vacated and the case was 
remanded on other grounds. (Opinion, p.8, n.2.) The Court also addressed the 
presentation of evidence related to G.O.'s psychological issues and found that 
psychological symptoms are not an injury under I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A). (Opinion, pp.8-10.) 
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However, the Court noted that on remand the district court would have to address the 
right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment if the issue were to arise in a 
new trial. (Opinion, pp.12-13.) The State filed a timely Petition for Review which this 
Court granted. 
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ISSUES1 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion to Sever 
and Motion for Relief From Prejudicial Joinder the charges were 
properly 
2. Did the district court err when it to provide a "'"""' remedy once it learned 
that the court appointed interpreter was knowingly providing inaccurate and 
incomplete interpretation of witnesses' testimony? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it did not allow Mr. Orellana-
Castro to present evidence that G.O.'s psychological issues may have been the 
result of an uncharged sexual trauma, a nonconsensual sexual encounter with 
Jose? 
4. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Orellana-Castro's 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated because the 
accumulation of errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial? 
Although the Respondent limited the Brief in Support of Petition for Review to 
issues related to the joinder of the charges relating to G.O. to the charges relating to 
S.O., it was noted in the brief that four issues were addressed on appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.5.) This Court granted review 
"as to the issues presented in this appeal." (Order Granting Respondent's Petition for 
Review.) As such, in this Appellant's Brief on Review, Mr. Orellana-Castro will address 
all four issues as originally presented on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion To Sever And 
Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because The Charges Were Not Properly 
Joined 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion to sever. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the charges involving his 
step-daughters, G.O. and S.O., should have never been joined together because the 
alleged abuse occurred at different times, in different locations, involved different types 
of sexual contact, and was not part of a common scheme or plan as is required under 
the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of 
law, over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564 
(2007). Conversely, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the 
denial of a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes 
joinder was proper in the first place. Id. Mr. Orellana-Castro is challenging that the 
charges were not properly joined and, as such, he asserts that this Court should 
exercise free review. 
C. Relevant Factual Information 
In the case at hand, Mr. Orellana-Castro filed a Motion to Sever and Motion for 
Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. (R., pp.112-113.) The motion noted that the charges 
were prejudicially joined because the alleged offenses occurred at different times and 
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places, are totally unrelated, involve different alleged victims, do not show a common 
plan or scheme, and do not serve to establish any exceptions under LR.E. 404(b) for 
admission of other crime, wrong or act evidence in the other cause if the cases were 
severed. (R., pp.112-113.) In the brief in support of the Motion to Sever, it was noted 
that the alleged victims clid not always live with Mr. Orellana-Castro, G.O. lived at home 
and S.O. primarily lived with her grandparents; that the events charged occurred at 
different times and in different locations; that the girls were different ages, G.O. being 
15-years-old and S.O. being 9-years-old; that the conduct charged is of a different 
nature; that the facts upon which the charges were based cannot support a claim of a 
common scheme or any other 404(b) purpose; and that permitting joinder could only 
serve "to prey upon the passions or prejudice of the jury." (R., pp.123-"125.) 
The State opposed the motion to sever noting that the alleged crimes were part 
of a common scheme or plan by Mr. Orellana-Castro to have sexual contact with his 
step-daughters and that their testimony would act to corroborate each other. 
(R., pp.132-133.) In a brief in support of the State's objection to the motion to sever, the 
State also noted that all but one of the acts was alleged to have occurred in the family 
home, that the girls were about the same size, that the girls are only separated by one 
grade in school, and that the alleged events occurred over an approximately 15 month 
period. (R., pp.139-140.) The State asserted again that the cases "are connected in 
many ways, but most clearly by the familial relationship." (R., p.140.) 
At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel reiterated that the charges 
involving G.O. are entirely different than the charges involving S.O.; different conduct, 
differently timed, and different locations. (Tr., p.35, Ls.1-7.) It was also noted that the 
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charges do not involve conduct that was the predicate for the conduct with the other, 
either S.O. to G.O. or vice versa and, as such, cannot involve a common plan or 
scheme. (Tr., p.40, Ls:15-23.) The State simply asserted that the conduct was similar, 
occurred primarily at the family's residence, and that the charges should remain joined 
because Mr. Orellana-Castro "had a scheme or design to sexually abuse his two step-
daughters." (Tr., p.36, Ls.1-15.) 
The district court found that there were similarities in the locations of the alleged 
abuse, that the girls are close in age, and that while the sexual abuse of S.O. is 
somewhat different than the alleged abuse of G.O., "overall the evidence is sufficient to 
constitute a common scheme or plan." (Tr., p.42, L.9 p.43, L.4.) It was determined 
that the potential prejudice would be alleviated by the instruction that the jury must 
decide each count separately. (Tr., p.43, Ls.2-·14.) The district court also issued a 
written order on the motion to sever. (R., pp.153-154.) In denying the motion, the court 
found that "the charged acts of the defendant were sufficient to satisfy the showing of a 
common plan or scheme and that there was no undue prejudice and that any prejudice 
could be mitigated by the jury instructions." (R., pp.153-154.) 
D. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion To Sever 
And Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because The Charges Were Not 
Properly Joined 
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho 
Criminal Rules. Field, 144 Idaho at 565; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 790 (Ct. App. 
2007). Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may order two or more 
informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single 
information. I.C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same information 
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if the offenses, "are based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." 
I.C.R. 8(a). Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient nexus between 
them in order to be properly joined. State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 358, 361-362 
(Ct. App. 2003). Whether the initial joinder was proper depends upon what is alleged by 
the State, not what the proof at trial ultimately shows. Field, 144 Idaho at 565 (quoting 
State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975)). Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a 
defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as 
corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State v. Wilbanks, 
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973). 
Even when joinder under I.C.R. 8(a) is interpreted broadly, the charges were 
improperly joined. On review, Mr. Orellana-Castro maintains that the charges involving 
G.O. and S.O. were improperly joined because the offenses do not constitute a 
common plan or scheme.2 
2 The State has mischaracterized the Court of Appeals' holding in the Opinion. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Court of Appeals did not hold that whether 
evidence would be admissible in each of the alleged victim's trials, if they had been held 
separately, is a central question to determining whether the charges were properly 
joined. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.11-14.) Instead, the 
Court of Appeals found that recent case law interpreting the legal phrase "common 
scheme or plan" under I.R.E. 404(b) was also applicable to the phrase "common 
scheme or plan" under I.C.R. 8. The Court found that the 404(b) case law was 
persuasive and the understanding of what constituted a common scheme or plan was 
the same under both 1.R.E. 404(b) and I.C.R. 8(a). The Court specifically noted that "we 
consider [State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009)] as persuasive authority for determining 
what amounts of a common scheme or plan for purposes of joiner." (Opinion, pp.4-5.) 
As such, this holding does not alter the analysis for what charges can be joined together 
to an "admissibility" question, but rather properly alters what can be considered a 
common scheme or plan to comport with the current legal understanding of the phrase. 
The State has also correctly asserted that case law from a variety of jurisdictions 
has held that I.C.R. 8(a)'s federal counterpart should be broadly construed in favor of 
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In State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 91 (1984 ), Mr. Schwartzmiller was 
convicted of three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct which took place in the late 
1970's with two fourteen year old boys. Even though the acts occurred at different 
times and with different people, the Court held the counts were properly joined because 
the facts demonstrated a common plan. Id. at 92. Schwartzmiller frequented areas 
where young boys may be found, befriended boys with no father figure in the home, 
enticed them from their homes, lowered their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs 
and alcohol, and committed sex acts upon them. Id. at 93. 
In State v. Field, Mr. Field was charged with one count of lewd conduct and one 
count of sexual battery. Field, 144 Idaho at 563-564. The first offense was committed 
against a seven-year-old girl in 2003. Id. at 566. H.P.'s mother had arranged for H.P. to 
stay temporarily with the Fields, during that stay Mr. Field asked her to sit on his lap, 
she complied, and that he began to rub her stomach underneath her clothing, put his 
hand underneath her underwear and "put his finger inside of [her] private." Id. The 
second offense was committed against a seventeen-year-old girl in 2001. Id. T.B. 
testified that she and her friend were asked to housesit and babysit Field's stepdaughter 
while the Fields were out of town. During this time, Mr. Field asked T.B. to lie down on 
the bed next to him so that he could give her a back rub and as he was rubbing her 
joinder. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.15-17.) However, 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that even if I.C.R. 8(a) is interpreted broadly, a broad 
interpretation does not necessitate that sound legal reasoning, such as case law 
determining what constitutes a common plan or scheme under the exact same phrasing 
as I.RE. 404(b), should be disregarded or abandoned. Furthermore, applying the 
slightly more circumscribed view regarding what constitutes a common scheme or plan 
at the initial joinder stage saves time and resources. This is especially true because 
giving a very broad interpretation will likely only result in the court granting relief from 
prejudicial joinder at a later date. 
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back, he also began to kiss her and say things like "he liked touching [her]" and "[her] 
skin was soft." Id. T.B. testified that Mr. Field put his hand inside her underwear and 
rubbed her entire buttocks. Id. 
The State's argument was that the cases were properly joined because Mr. Field 
had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that came into his home because the 
"incidents occurred at different times, under different circumstances, and involved 
different parties with significantly different ages." Id. The Court found that the separate 
acts did not constitute part of a common scheme or plan. Id. The Court went on to note 
that, "[t]here is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense against T.B. 
he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P. specifically, or to commit an 
offense against someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id. The Court also 
mentioned as important factors in its decision that the offenses were not part of 
continuing action against one individual or have the "striking similarities" found in 
Schwartzmiller. Id. As a result, the Court found that the joinder of the offenses was 
erroneous. Id. at 567. 
The basis alleged by the State for joinder of the charges in this case were that 
the alleged crimes were part of a common scheme or plan for Mr. Orellana-Castro to 
have sexual contact with his step-daughters and that their testimony would act to 
corroborate each other. (R., pp.132-133.) This allegation is not sufficient to meet the 
standard articulated in I.C.R. 8(a). In addition, the analysis of whether charges were 
part of a common plan or otherwise connected together looks to whether there existed a 
continuity of action or purpose. See Field, 144 Idaho at 565. Neither the assertions 
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contained in the State's objection to the Motion to Sever, nor the facts underlying the 
charges, meet the legal standards for joinder. 
Applying Field to the facts of his case, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the result 
must be the same, a finding that the charges do not constitute a common plan. 
Although the girls were both Mr. Orellana-Castro's stepdaughters, it is there that the 
similarities end. The girls were not the same age, G.O. being 15-years-old and S.O. 
being 9-years-old; both did not primarily live in the family home; the alleged abuse was 
strikingly different - ranging from alleged intercourse with G.O. (Tr., p.558, L.1 - p.562, 
L.5, p.564, L.6 - p.567, L.11) to touching of the breast (Tr., p.3·12, Ls.10-16) and 
touching of no part of the body that is normally considered a private part of the body 
with S.O. (Tr., p.315, L.8 - p.316, L.16); and the abuse occurred at different times. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence supporting a common scheme or plan as there is no 
evidence that at the time Mr. Orellana-Castro engaged in inappropriate conduct with 
either girl he had a plan to also commit an offense against the other step-daughter. 
In Field, the Idaho State Supreme Court analyzed what a common plan was for 
the purposes of joinder and relied upon cases addressing common plans or schemes 
under I.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 565-566. All of the cases relied upon in Field were decided 
prior to the clarification provided by State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009), State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010), and their progeny. Field was the first case to offer 
clarification of what constituted a common plan or scheme under the modern 
understanding of I.R.E. 404(b). 
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the "common scheme or plan" 
contemplated by 1.R.E. 404(b) is "a common scheme or plan embracing the commission 
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of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the 
other .... " Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55 (citations omitted). In Johnson the Court explained 
that "at a minimum," this rule requires, "evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond 
the bare fact that" the defendant has committed the same kind of misconduct in the 
past. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. The Court continued, stating that, "[t]he events must 
be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal 
propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same person 
committed all the acts." Id. (citations omitted). 
Mr. Johnson was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 
sixteen and the Court held that the district court erred in admitting evidence the 
defendant had abused his sister when she was about the same age as the victim in the 
charged offense. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. The Court found similarities in the 
charged and uncharged incidents (victims were both young girls about the same age, 
both victims were younger members of the defendant's family for whom the defendant 
was an "authority figure," and in both cases, the abuse took the same form) to be "far 
too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in the defendant's 
behavior." Id. The Court clarified that evidence showing only "generalized similarities," 
between charged and uncharged conduct, such as the victim's sex or age, or the means 
by which a defendant gains access to them "is more accurately described as 
inadmissible evidence merely demonstrating the defendant's predisposition for 
opportunistically molesting children." Id. at 669 n. 5 (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 54). 
Thus, to be admissible under Rule 404(b ), "evidence of prior misconduct must show 
more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the charged conduct, but 
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must instead show that the defendant's charged and uncharged conduct is linked in a 
way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of 
conduct leading up to the charged offense." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 10 (2013). 
In the case at hand, there is no evidence to show a common scheme or plan. 
The evidence merely shows that Mr. Orellana-Castro may have engaged in other 
inappropriate conduct on other occasions. The evidence does not demonstrate a 
planned course of connected behavior as is required under the modern application of 
I.RE. 404(b). The district court determined that the charges were properly joined 
because they demonstrate a common scheme or plan. In reaching its decision, the 
district court noted that there were similarities in the locations of the alleged abuse and 
that the girls are close in age. (Tr., p.42, Ls.9-14.) The court did recognize that the 
sexual abuse of S.O. is somewhat different than the aileged abuse of G.O. (Tr., p.42, 
L.22 - p.43, L.1.) However, the similarities between Mr. Orellana-Castro's alleged 
abuse of G.O. and S.O. are essentially the same or less compelling than the general 
similarities in Johnson, that the victims' sex, age, and the means by which a defendant 
gained access to the victims. Further, the charges are not linked in a way that provides 
any inference that the conduct towards either G.O. or S.O. was planned as part of a 
course of conduct leading up to the abuse of the other step-daughter. Therefore, the 
charges do not show a common scheme or plan. Rather, they are merely suggestive of 
Mr. Orellana-Castro's predisposition for sexually abusing underage females, precisely 
the kind of character evidence barred by Rule 404.3 As such, joinder in this case was 
3 The State has asserted in the Brief in Support of Petition for Review that the 
charges were "intertwined, and the evidence overlapping, in both [G.O. and S.O.'s] 
reporting and investigation." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, 
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improper because there was an insufficient nexus pursuant to !.C.R. 8(a) and, as a 
result, the district court erred when it denied the motion to sever the charges related to 
G.O. from the charges related to S.O. 
E. The District Court Abused Its Discretion VVhen It Denied The Motion To Sever 
And Motion For Relief From Prejudicial Joinder Because Failure To Sever The 
Charges Related To G.O. From Those Related To S.O. Would Result In 
Prejudice To Mr. Orellana-Castro 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that the charges were properly joined, 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the motion to sever should have been granted because 
of the prejudice he suffered as result of the charges being tried together. Idaho Criminal 
Rule 14 provides that, "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses ... the court may order the state to elect between counts, grant 
separate trials of counts, . . . or provide whatever other relief justice requires." 
i.C.R. 14. An abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a 
motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14. Field, 144 Idaho at 564. When reviewing 
an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant has 
p.23.) The alleged abuse did not share common characteristics as the alleged victims 
where different ages when the abuse allegedly occurred, the alleged abuse occurred in 
different locations, at totally different times, and the type of alleged abuse was 
drastically different. The fact that the charges related to both alleged victims were 
investigated at the same time and that both made disclosures near the same time does 
not necessitate a joint trial. The investigation related to each alleged victim, while 
occurring at the same time, was independent for both G.O and S.O. The alleged 
victims were interviewed by police separately. (Tr., p.411, L.2 - p.412, L.10, p.412, 
L.11 - p.413, L.10.) They also submitted to separate CARES interviews, conducted by 
different individuals: Joan Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. and Kerry Koontz 
completed an evaluation of S.0. (Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9, p.638, L.4 - p.640, 
L.24.) 
Additionally, the State's concern about being able to tell the story of how the girls 
reported is not legitimate or persuasive. First, how and when abuse is reported is not 
an element that must be proven at trial. Second, it would take only minimal effort for the 
State to instruct its witnesses on how to discuss the disclosures without mentioning the 
other alleged victim. 
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presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint tria! which 
denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Egui!ior, ·137 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In cases such as this, Idaho appellate courts review the trial proceeding to determine 
whether one or more of the following potential sources of prejudice appeared: (a) the 
possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the 
evidence properly segregated; (b) the potential that the defendant may be confounded 
in presenting defenses; and (c) the possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant 
is guilty of one crime and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or 
her criminal disposition-he or she is a bad person. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
also pointed out that joinder of similar offenses for trial may lead the jury to regard one 
offense as corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State 
v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973). 
This is a case where the only evidence that the crimes occurred was statements 
from the alleged victims that Mr. Orellana-Castro had inappropriate sexual contact with 
them. There was no physical evidence or witnesses to the alleged conduct. It was 
clear throughout the trial that G.O. had some credibility issues. The verdicts in this case 
support the notion that the jury also had concerns about G.O.'s credibility. (R., pp.384-
385.) If the jury had fully believed G.O., it would have entered guilty verdicts for the two 
lewd conduct charges. It is also clear from the verdict that the jury did believe S.O. 
Hearing testimony from both girls is tantamount to presenting character evidence which 
is normally excluded due to well founded fears that a jury may find a defendant guilty 
based upon the idea that if he had done something before he is more likely to do it 
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again, acting in conformity with his character to engage in bad acts.4 Mr. Orellana-
Castro asserts that because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a he said she 
said case, that had the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been different. 
Further, Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that there is valid concern that the jury reached a 
compromise verdict in his case. As such, he assert that for these reasons and the 
reasoning articulated throughout Issue I, that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to sever the charges related to G.O. from those related to S.O. 
F. The Erroneous Joinder And Failure To Sever Are Not Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
Mr. Orellana-Castro adopts the reasoning of the Court of Appeals regarding 
harmless error: 
The State's evidence in this case was not overwhelming. G.O. testified 
that she had been forcibly raped, both vaginally and anally, by Orellana-
Castro. S.O. testified that Orellana-Castro placed his hand under her shirt 
while she was asleep in a car he was driving and that, on another 
occasion, he attempted to remove her swimsuit while pulling her into his 
bed. No physical evidence corroborated the alleged victims' testimony. 
The improper joinder in this case led to the jury hearing potentially 
prejudicial, inadmissible evidence. As noted above, whether two or more 
crimes constitute parts of a "common scheme or plan" justifying joinder 
4 The State has asserted that joinder was not prejudicial because evidence of the 
alleged conduct with G.O. would have been admissible in the trial for alleged abuse of 
S.O. to show intent. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.30-31.) 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the testimony of G.O. would not have been admissible 
to prove intent in S.O.'s trial. The fact that G.O. accused Mr. Orellana-Castro of raping 
her does not prove that when he played with the tie of S.O.'s swimsuit, near her neck, 
while she was fully dressesd, he intended the touching to be sexual. G.O.'s testimony 
would be nothing more than impermissible character evidence and would be 
inadmissible in a trial for the alleged abuse of S.O. 
Mr. Orellana-Castro also notes the State made no argument that the testimony of 
S.O.'s alleged abuse would have been admissible in G.O.'s trial. This, in and of itself, is 
a concession by the State that, at a minimum, Mr. Orellana-Castro was prejudiced by 
having a joint trial because the jury would have never heard S.O.'s testimony in a 
separate trial for the charges involving G.O. 
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under !.C.R. 8(a) is closely related to the question whether evidence of 
each of the charges would be admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) in a trial of 
each charge separately. We have held above that the allegations of 
offenses against S.O. and against G.O. were not components of a 
"common scheme or plan," and the State has urged no other basis upon 
which one victim's allegations would have been admissible in a separate 
trial for the alleged offenses against the other victim. The joinder, which 
allowed the jury to hear this otherwise inadmissible evidence, thus leads 
to the possible prejudice that Rule 404(b) is designed to avoid. Admitting 
irrelevant evidence of other misconduct risks that, as stated in Eguilior, 
"the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find 
him ... guilty of the other simply because of his ... criminal disposition." 
Specific to child molestation cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has noted 
that the admission of other molestation evidence risks that jurors will act 
on a "belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful 
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior." Johnson, 148 Idaho 
at 670, 227 P.3d at 924. Further, as noted in Wilbanks, the jury may have 
regarded one of the victim's allegations as corroborative of the other's 
when thern is no true corroborative value in the testimony. 
The risk is particularly pronounced in this case because G.O.'s 
credibility was heavily attacked. The defense presented testimony from 
G.O.'s mother and maternal grandmother that she was dishonest. G.O.'s 
mother testified that G.O. "always lied" about "certain things" and was 
angry that her mother had married the defendant. G.O.'s grandmother 
testified that G.O. "has always told lies" and described G.O. as willing to 
get what she wanted "no matter what it takes.'' At least one juror must 
have had doubts about G.O.'s veracity, for the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict on the two counts charging lewd conduct with G.O. We cannot say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Orellana-
Castro guilty of the less serious charges of sexual abuse of G.O. if they 
had not heard S.O.'s testimony also making allegations against him. 
Likewise, hearing G.O.'s testimony may have influenced the jury's 
view of the charges concerning S.O. As to the count involving Orellana-
Castro's conduct with S.O. at his home, Orellana-Castro testified that he 
was teasing and playful and that his conduct was not sexual. G.O.'s 
testimony alleging forceful and overtly sexual assaults by Orellana-Castro 
could have contributed to the jury's finding that Orellana-Castro acted with 
intent to gratify lust or sexual desire in his actions with S.O. 
The trial pitted Orellana-Castro's credibility against the credibility of 
the alleged victims. On this record, we cannot say beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the improper joinder of the charges did not contribute to the 
verdicts. Accordingly, the convictions must be vacated. 
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(Opinion, pp.6-8.) 
IL 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide A Proper Remedy Once It Learned 
That The Court Appointed Interpreter Was Knowingly Providing Inaccurate And 
Incomplete Interpretation Of Witnesses' Testimony 
A. Introduction 
During the presentation of defense witnesses, defense counsel noticed that a 
witness, Ms. Orozco, was speaking for a long period of time and that the interpreter was 
providing a very short translation. Defense counsel raised this concern to the district 
court and it was promptly disregarded. At the start of the next day of trial, defense 
counsel again raised his concern to the district court. At that time, the district court 
called the interpreter, Ernie Hale, to the stand. Mr. Hale admitted that he did not 
accurately translate the testimony, noting that on at least a couple of occasions he 
summarized the witness's statement, did not translate portions of the testimony, and 
provided one of several answers provided by the witness. The district court determined 
from the interpreter's testimony that the jury was provided with the gist of Ms. Orozco's 
testimony and determined that nothing further was necessary. Defense counsel then 
made a motion for a mistrial, which was denied based upon similar reasoning. 
B. Standards Of Review 
A court's decision regarding appointment of an interpreter is generally 
discretionary, but a question as to whether a trial court's decision met minimum 
statutory or constitutional requirements is an issue of law subject to free review. 
State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 
7 41 (Ct. App. 2003 ). The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound 
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discretion of the district cou1i and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed 
on appeal. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386,389 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Provide A Proper Remedy Once It 
Learned That The Court Appointed Interpreter Was Knowingly Providing 
Inaccurate And Incomplete Interpretation Of V\/itnesses' Testimony 
The right to an interpreter is codified in Idaho Code § 9-205 and Idaho Criminal 
Rule 28. The language used in both the statute and the rule are nearly identical. Both 
provide that in a "criminal action in which any witness ... does not understand or speak 
the English language ... the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret .. . 
the testimony of such witness ... Upon appointment of such interpreter, the .. . 
interpreter shall be sworn to accurately and fully interpret the testimony given at the 
hearing or trial to the best of [his or the interpreter's] ability before assuming his duties 
as an interpreter." I.C. § 9-205; I.C.R. 28. 
Idaho has also articulated specific policies relating to court interpreters. Idaho 
Court Administrative Rule 52 states that: 
(a) Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Supreme Court and the 
intent of these rules to secure the rights, constitutional and otherwise, of 
persons who, because of a non-English-speaking cultural background or 
physical impairment, are unable to understand or communicate 
adequately in the English language when they appear in the courts, are 
involved in court proceedings, or are otherwise seeking access to the 
courts. 
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, the following words have 
the following meanings: 
(6) "Non-English-speaking person" means any principal party in interest or 
witness whose communication or understanding in the English language 
does not permit effective participation in a court proceeding. 
(e) Interpreter oath. All court interpreters, before commencing their 
duties, shall take the following oath: 
"Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will interpret and/or translate 
accurately, completely, and impartially, using your best skill and judgment 
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in accordance with the standards prescribed by law and the Idaho Code of 
Professional Responsibility for Interpreters in the Judiciary?" 
(f) Removal of an interpreter in an individual case. Any of the following 
actions shall be good cause for a judge to remove an interpreter: (1) being 
unable to interpret adequately; (2) knowingly and willfully making false 
interpretation while serving in an official capacity ... 
I.C.A.R. 52. The competency of an interpreter must be challenged prior to the time he 
begins translating, and it is presumed he will translate accurately. State v. Puente-
Gomez, 121 Idaho 702, 705 (Ct. App. 1992). The defendant bears the burden of 
negating this presumption. Id. 
In the case at hand, the interpreter was administered an oath, presumably 
consistent with the administrative ruie. (Tr., p.709, L.24.) The district court was alerted 
to an issue with interpretation shortly after Mr. Hale began interpreting for witnesses. 
Near the beginning of Ms. Orozco's testimony, defense counsel asked the interpreter, 
"Do you mean all that talk is just that little bit. ... Was that her full answer?" (Tr., p.712, 
Ls.10-11, 14-15.) The district court told defense counsel to not ask questions of the 
interpreter. (Tr., p.712, Ls.16-17.) Interpretation continued for the rest of the day, 
including interpretation for Mr. Orozco and another witness, Mr. Coria. 
At the start of the trial the next day, defense counsel again raised concerns that 
the interpreter was not providing a verbatim interpretation of the witnesses' testimony. 
(Tr., p.775, L.18 - p.776, L.9.) The interpreter, Mr. Hale, was then sworn and admitted 
that he did not provide an accurate or complete translation. (Tr., p.777, L.2 - p.778, 
L.7.) He was not able to recall the circumstances or occasions on which he did not 
interpret verbatim. (Tr., p.778, Ls.8-11.) He was sure he had not provided an accurate 
translation "once or twice" during Maria Orozco's testimony and that it was less of an 
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issue with Adan Coria. (Tr., p.778, Ls.12-20.} During Ms. Orozco's testimony, when 
they were discussing G.O.'s truthfulness, he did not translate accurately, noting that 
Ms. Orozco had discussed incidents in the past and then "kind of generally editorialize 
on her opinion now." (Tr., p.778, L.21 - p.779, L.5.) He recalled that she had testified 
that G.O. had always been into misbehaving and then discussed a specific instance that 
he could not recall. (Tr., p.779, Ls.14-21.) The interpreter was then asked by the 
district court if he promised to translate everything from now on verbatim; Mr. Hale 
responded that he would. (Tr., p.780, L.20 - p.781, L.1.) 
Defense counsel then asserted that he was being informed that the inaccurate 
interpretation had occurred on more than a couple of occasions. (Tr., p.781, Ls.2-7.) 
The district court stated that it was "affording [defense counsel] the opportunity to 
correct the record," but that the interpreter testified under oath it only occurred on one or 
two occasions, and that: 
Certainly, I think the gist of Maria Orozco's testimony overall is that 
the grandmother has the opinion that [G.O.] is not a truthful person. I 
believe that that has been adequately communicated to the jury. So 
absent a further offer of proof, I'm not inclined to do anything further at this 
time. 
(Tr., p.781, Ls.8-23.) 
Counsel then reminded the district court of the occasion where he had mentioned 
that Ms. Orozco's statement seemed far longer than the interpretation and the district 
court had told him to not question the interpreter. (Tr., p.781, L.24 - p.782, L.7.) The 
interpreter was then questioned about that specific incident and he admitted that that 
was an occasion that he did not interpret accurately, noting that Ms. Orozco answered 
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the question several times and he just provided one of the answers. (Tr., p.783, Ls:1-
9.) 
Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial. (Tr., p.783, L.16 - p.784, L.8.) 
The State objected. (Tr., p.784, L.10- p.785, L.25.) The court recognized its discretion 
and found that: 
Clearly, there is some evidence before this court that with respect 
to the testimony of Maria Orozco, that the interpreter did not, in some 
occasions, translate verbatim what it was that the witness was saying in 
response to any question. 
Clearly, Maria Orozco was - from the - considering the testimony 
as a whole was a character witness for the defendant to testify as to his 
good character. She was also a witness for the defense to testify as to 
her opinion or knowledge of reputation of [G.O.] for truthfulness. 
Certainly, overall, considering the testimony as a whole, the court is 
convinced that the testimony that she conveyed to the jury was that she 
found the defendant to be a good person, that she found [G.O.] to be 
someone who is untruthful. Certainly, I think that was conveyed clearly to 
the jury. 
It is unknown to this court as to the extent of the testimony that 
perhaps was not translated verbatim. Perhaps some of what she may 
have said may have been beneficial to the defense, maybe some which 
she may have said may have been beneficial to the state. 
What I do know is the purpose of her testimony was to challenge 
the credibility of [G.O.] and to support the character of the defendant. I 
think overall her testimony has come out in that fashion. 
Clearly, at this point in time the court does not find that there is -
while I would agree that a lack of verbatim translation should never have 
occurred, the court at this point in time, based on the state of the record, 
cannot say that the lack of verbatim translation was prejudicial to the 
defendant absent a further offer of proof as to perhaps what testimony 
was not verbatimly translated as to how that might have further bolstered 
the testimony of Maria Orozco. And so at this time the court would deny 
the motion for mistrial without prejudice to the defense renewing the 
motion at a later date on a further offer of proof. 
(Tr., p.786, L.8 - p.788, L.3.) 
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Immediately following the questioning of the interpreter he was allowed to 
interpret the testimony of Silvia Orellana, the alleged victim's mother. (See Tr., p.828, 
Ls.18-19, p.830, L22 (transcript refers to interpreter during Ms. Orellana's testimony).) 
Mr. Orellana-Castro met his burden of alerting the district court to a problem with 
interpretation and provided enough of a record to prove that the interpretation was 
neither accurate or complete as is required under Idaho Code § 9-205, Idaho Criminal 
Rule 28, and Idaho Court Administrative Rule 52.5 At this point, the district court was 
aware that the interpreter had violated his oath and the district court had a duty to 
provide an appropriate remedy as the interpreter was working for the district court in an 
official capacity. The district court's finding, that the jury heard the gist of Ms. Orozco's 
testimony, was misplaced and the district court should have corrected the error. 
In making this determination, the district court relied only upon Mr. Hale's 
testimony that the interpretation errors occurred only a few times. While Mr. Hale was 
sworn before testifying (Tr., p.777, Ls.2-3), he was also sworn to provide accurate and 
complete interpretation, he openly admitted that he violated that oath, and failed to 
perform his duties. (Tr., p.709, L.24, p.777, L.2 - p.778, L.7.) As such, Mr. Hale's 
credibility was critically diminished and the district court's total reliance on his 
representations was misplaced. At that point in time, the district court merely 
admonished Mr. Hale to properly execute his translations in the future; asking if he 
"promised" to now do the job he had previously taken an oath to perform. (Tr., p.780, 
L.20 - p.781, L.1.) However, the district court had good cause to remove Mr. Hale as 
5 The issue presented on appeal, regarding an interpreting knowingly providing 
inaccurate and incomplete interpretation, is an issue of first impression in the State of 
Idaho. 
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an interpreter under I.C.A.R. 52(f)(2): knowingly and willfully making false interpretation 
while serving in an official capacity. I.C.A.R. 52. It should be noted that at the time 
Mr. Hale was interpreting the witnesses' testimony, another interpreter was on hand 
interpreting the court proceedings for Mr. Orellana-Castro. This interpreter was not 
called by the district court to assist in its investigation into the extent of the interpretation 
error nor were any other steps taken to investigate the extent of the inaccurate 
interpretation. 
Further, the failure to provide a sufficient remedy implicated Mr. Orellana-
Castro's constitutional rights. Specifically, failing to cure the interpretation error resulted 
in a violation of Mr. Orellana-Castro's rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article l, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State's Constitution and 
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a right to due process of law. U.S. 
CONST. amends. V and XIV, lo. CONST. art. I,§ 13. Due process requires criminal trials 
to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). A trial 
simply can not be fundamentally fair when the defendant's witnesses are not heard in 
the same manner as the State's are due to an interpreter, while acting in his official 
capacity, disregarding his oath and making the conscious choice to not properly and 
completely interpret a witness's testimony. 
Additionally, the interpreter's actions amount to a violation of Mr. Orellana-
Castro's Sixth Amendment and Article I § 13 rights to a jury trial, to compel witnesses, 
to present a defense, and to an impartial jury. The right to present a defense is 
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protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made 
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, ·Jg (1967). "This right is a fundamental element of 
due process of law." Id. The right to present a defense includes the right to offer 
testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant's version 
of the facts "to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Id. "The right to a jury trial 
contained in the Sixth Amendment . . . includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole 
judge of the weight of the testimony."' State v. Elmore, 228 P.3d 760, 765-66 (Wash. 
2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 889 P.2d 929, 838 (\Nash. 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 
60 P. 403, 405 (Wash. 1900))). It is the jury's vital and exclusive role to make all 
credibility determinations, a role that is also rooted in one's Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial. Although Mr. Orellana-Castro was certainly allowed to compel witnesses in his 
defense, the court's appointed interpreter interfered with that right by prohibiting the jury 
from hearing the complete and accurate testimony of defense witnesses, robbed them 
of a full opportunity to make credibility determinations, and denied Mr. Orellana-Castro 
the opportunity to present the jury with his full version of the facts. 
An inaccurate interpretation cannot be properly resolved by the district court 
ignoring the issue. The district court was made aware of the problem, disregarded its 
discretion in overseeing the interpreter it employed, failed to remove the interpreter, 
failed to investigate further into the known issue, failed to provide any workable 
opportunities to correct the error or declare a mistrial. Instead, the district court chose 
to allow for the violation of Mr. Orellana-Castro's rights and attempted to sweep the 
issue under the rug by declaring, based solely on the testimony of Mr. Hale, that the jury 
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heard enough of the defense witness's testimony to get the gist of her proffered 
testimony. However, interpreting merely the gist of a witness's testimony does not 
satisfy due process and does not comply with the United States or Idaho Constitutions. 
As such, it was error when the district court failed to properly address the interpretation 
issue and failed to provide a remedy to correct the error. 
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Orellana-Castro's Motion 
For A Mistrial 
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that, "[a] 
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the 
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the 
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). The Supreme Court has held that the question on review is not 
whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under the circumstances 
existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or events which brought 
about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when viewed in the context of the 
entire record. State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003); State v. Watkins, 
152 Idaho 764, 765-66 (Ct. App. 2012). The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests 
within the sound discretion of the district court and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will 
not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996); 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to grant a mistrial. He asserts that because the district court failed to provide any other 
reasonable opportunity to correct the interpretation error, granting a mistrial was the 
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only way to remedy the issue. His arguments in support of this assertion can be found 
in section C above and are incorporated herein by reference. 
2. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Denial Of Mr. Orellana-Castro's 
Motion For A Mistrial Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: "To hold an error as 
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. ·18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous 
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden 
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the State cannot show beyond a reasonable 
possibility that the failure to provide accurate interpretation of defense witnesses, called, 
in part, to testify regarding both Mr. Orellana-Castro and alleged victim G.O.'s credibility 
did not contribute to the convictions. In this case, there were no witnesses to the 
alleged criminal activities and no physical evidence. As such, credibility determinations 
had a heightened value and it cannot be said that the error did not contribute to the 
convictions. 
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l 11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Did Not Allow Mr. Orellana-Castro To 
Present Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Issues May Have Been The Result Of An 
Uncharged Sexual Trauma, A Nonconsensual Sexual Encounter With Jose 
A. Introduction 
During trial, Mr. Orellana-Castro made an offer of proof and requested that he be 
allowed to present evidence through G.O. and her mother that G.O. had non-
consensual intercourse with a man name Jose several months after the alleged abuse 
by Mr. Orellana-Castro and very close in time to her disclosure to a friend's mother that 
she had been abused by Mr. Orellana-Castro. Prior to the offer of proof, the State 
presented several witnesses that discussed G.O.'s mental health and attributed her 
issues to suffering from a trauma. They opined that the trauma could be suffering 
sexual abuse by her step-father. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserted that evidence about the 
sexual incident with Jose was necessary to show that G.O.'s psychological issues or 
injuries could have been caused by another source and that he was not the source of 
her psychological injuries. The district court found that 1.R.E. 412(b )(2)(A) is limited to 
physical injuries and does not allow for prior sexual behavior to be admitted to show that 
another individual is the source of a psychological injury. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts 
that the State put psychological injuries at issue by presenting several experts who 
testified about G.O.'s mental health and drew the connection that she was suffering 
from these psychological injuries as a result of Mr. Orellana-Castro's alleged conduct, 
that the plain language of I.R.E. 412 does not limit "injury" to physical injury only, that 
the evidence was relevant, and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. 
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8. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of statutes and judicial rules is a matter of free review. State v. 
Herrera, 149 Idaho 216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009). The decision whether to admit 412 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 721-722 
(Ct. App. 2003). However, questions of relevancy are reviewed de nova. State v. 
MacDona!cJ, 131 Idaho 367, 369 (Ct. App. 1998). Once deemed relevant, the 
determination of probative value outweighing the prejudicial effect is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. MacDonald, 131 Idaho at 369. When a trial court's discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: (1) whether the lower couri correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and 
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Did Not Allow Mr. Orellana-
Castro To Present Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Issues May Have Been 
The Result Of An Uncharged Sexual Trauma, A Nonconsensual Sexual 
Encounter With Jose 
A Motion for Leave to Offer Evidence of [G.O.]'s Reputation Pursuant to Rules 
405 and 412 was filed. (R., pp.114-115.) The original offer of proof discussed that the 
defense may want to discuss some of G.O.'s sexual history. (R., pp.116-117.) 
The State presented the testimony of several witnesses who provided counseling 
or mental health assessments for G.O. The first of such witnesses was Joan Kauffman. 
(Tr., p.439, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Kauffman conducted an interview of G.O. at CARES and had 
G.O. complete a trauma screening checklist. (Tr., p.448, L.14 - p.458, L.9.) G.O.'s 
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results showed that she had "very high" anxiety and depression, some anger, worry 
about someone killing her, a bit of "suicide worry," a lot of sexual preoccupation, and 
"very high" sexual distress. (Tr., p.458. Ls.2-9.) Ms. Kauffman went on to say that the 
answers provided by G.O. showed that she had "a lot of confusion, a lot of fears," "a lot 
of self hatred maybe or worrying about I want to kill myself, wanting to hurt myself, and, 
you know, feeling afraid somebody might kill me," "a lot of anxiety and depression, post-
traumatic stress, disassociation," is very concerned about what is going on sexually, 
and has "very significantly high ... sexual distress." (Tr., p.463. Ls.20-25, p.465, Ls.1-
7.) CARES referred G.O. for counseling, also made a mental health referral, and 
encouraged her to "get some medication for her depression." (Tr., p.47·1, Ls.9-17.) 
Dr. Rick Yuvruian, a psychiatrist with St. Luke's Behavioral Heath, completed a 
standard psychiatric evaluation of G.O. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1-25.) Dr. Yuvruian diagnosed 
G.O. with depression not otherwise specified and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(hereinafter, PTSD). (Tr., p.503, Ls.14-17, p.507, Ls.14-22.) He also noted that she did 
have some anxiety, but not enough for a separate diagnosis, she has some suicidal 
ideation, and reported a history of cutting behavior. (Tr., p.508, Ls.10-13, p.510, Ls.12-
18, p.512, Ls.6-13.) In diagnosing PTSD, Dr. Yuvruian noted that G.O. said that she 
had nightmares and flashbacks; it was unclear if they were caused by the physical 
abuse she witnessed towards her mother or whether it was from sexual abuse on her. 
(Tr., p.506, Ls.9-23.) 
Eric Call, a licensed clinical social worker, completed a mental health 
assessment on G.O. (Tr., p.534, Ls.1-23.) He diagnosed G.O. with major depression, 
severe with psychotic features, and PTSD. (Tr., p.536, Ls.11-17.) The symptoms G.O. 
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reported in relation to depression were feeling depressed more often that not, not being 
able to sleep, change in appetite, weight loss, thought of harming herself or others, low 
self-esteem, hearing voices that told her to hurt herself, and seeing images that when 
they passed by her would give her chills. (Tr., p.539, Ls.7-18.) The symptoms reported 
in relation to the PTSD were sexual abuse by her stepfather, nightmares, avoiding 
places that reminded her of the abuse, flashbacks of the abuse, feeling different than 
others because of what happened to her, lack of concentration, and that these 
symptoms were affecting her functioning. (Tr., p.539, L.21 - p.540, L.2.) During her 
interview, she was very tearful, became anxious at times, reported hallucinations, 
reported cutting or self-harm, and noted that sometimes she thought she would be 
better off dead. (Tr., p.541, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Call determined that the trauma related to 
the PTSD diagnosis was the reported sexual abuse by her step-father and no other 
trauma was reported to him. (Tr., p.542, Ls.4-8.) As a result of this assessment, it was 
determined that G.O. qualified for programming, assistance with counseling and 
medication management, and G.O. was referred to Dr. Yuvruian and Preferred Child 
and Family Services. (Tr., p.542, Ls.9-15.) 
Jason Beard, a therapist with Preferred Child and Family Services, discussed 
general symptoms and issues that people who are the victims of sexual abuse deal 
with. (Tr., p.650, L.20 - p.654, L.21.) G.O. was referred to him to discuss her reported 
sexual abuse and related issues. (Tr., p.654, L.22 - p.655, L.8.) He met with G.O. 
approximately 15 times and discussed primarily the symptoms associated with the 
abuse like nightmares, inability to sleep, fears, frustration that family members did not 
protect or support her, and situations at school. (Tr., p.656, L.1 - p.659, L.6.) On 
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cross-examination, Mr. Beard admitted that many of the symptoms discussed could 
have been triggered by another trauma such as abuse at a young age. (Tr., p.663, 
Ls.7-21.) 
At the start of the fifth day of the jury trial, defense counsel made a motion to 
make an offer of proof regarding past sexual behavior of G.O. (Tr., p.766, Ls.22-25.) 
Defense counsel stated that at the Partida quinceanera G.O. had sex with a man 
named Jose. (Tr., p.767, Ls.8-12.) Jose had G.O. drink something that caused her to 
lose consciousness or be dizzy and G.O. did not understand what was happening. 
(Tr., p.767, Ls.13-17.) After it was over, Jose told G.O. that they had sex and G.O. has 
since admitted to having sex with Jose. (Tr., p.767, Ls.17-19.) Although G.O. has 
always had problems in the past, those problems have magnified since the incident with 
Jose; her symptoms of anxiety, sleeplessness, anger, and so on have increased. 
(Tr., p.767, Ls.20-25.) One of the State's themes in this case is that G.O. was injured or 
abused and that she suffers from mental health issues. (Tr., p.768, Ls.1-5.) This is 
evidenced by her representation that she has anxiety, anger, sleeplessness, acting out, 
fear of men, or, in the alternative, enhanced sexual activity. (Tr., p.768, Ls.5-10.) 
Counsel wanted to discuss the sexual activity with Jose to offer an alternative 
explanation for her psychological injury and the resulting effects. (Tr., p.768, Ls.11-14.) 
The State objected asserting that the injury contemplated by I.R.E. 412 is a 
physical injury. (Tr., p.769, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel responded that post traumatic 
stress disorder in an injury, that several State's experts testified that it is symptomatic in 
this case, that this evidence tends to explain why G.O. is suffering from these factors, 
and that this information is critical to the defense's case. (Tr., p.770, Ls.17-24.) 
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Counsel elaborated that G.O. would testify that she did not realize she was having 
intercourse with Jose, that it was involuntary due to the drink she was provided. 
(Tr., p.771, Ls.1-6.) In effect, G.O. was raped by Jose and that once that occurred her 
symptoms increased. (Tr., p.771, Ls.7-13.) 
The district court recognized that whether or not to allow the evidence was a 
discretionary decision and determined that under I.R.E. 412 this evidence would be 
related to evidence of past behavior with persons other than the defendant to explain 
the presence of semen or injury. (Tr., p.771, L.18 - p.773, L.7.) The district court 
expressed some concern that the sexual contact with Jose was not "subsequent 
behavior," then determined that under I.R.E. 412, the injury must be a physical injury not 
an emotional injury, and noted that the appellate courts "have not held that the defense 
can create such a scenario to allow for the introduction of 412 evidence." (Tr., p.773, 
L.8 - p.774, L.22.) The district court held that absence evident from the State about a 
physical injury, the evidence of sexual contact between G.O. and Jose would not be 
relevant under 1.R.E. 412. (Tr., p.775, Ls.7-15.) 
1. Under 1.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A) "Injury" Is Not Limited To Physical Injury And, 
Therefore, Evidence Of Psychological Injuries Is Also Admissible 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court erroneously found that I.R.E. 
412 contemplates only physical injuries and not psychological injuries. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 412, applicable to sex crime cases, states in pertinent part: 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which 
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual 
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, 
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
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(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by 
the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with 
respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury .... 
I.RE. 412. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the word "injury" is not limited in the Rule to 
encompass only physical injuries and that in interpreting I.RE. 412 the Court should 
find that psychological injuries are also contemplated by the use of the word "injury." 
When interpreting a court rule, the rules of statutory interpretation are used. See 
Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) ("We have, in the past, 
applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of our rules of civil 
procedure."). Statutory interpretation employs the following principals: 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. The 
statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court 
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none 
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be 
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 
147 Idaho 307 (2009)). 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the plain language does not limit the types of 
injuries for which evidence can be offered under the exception and, therefore, 
psychological injury evidence can also be presented under the Rule. Certainly, if I.RE. 
412 was meant to include only physical injuries, the word physical could have been 
easily included. For example, the corresponding Federal Rule states that: 
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or 
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: 
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual 
behavior; or 
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual predisposition. 
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(b) Exceptions. 
(1) Criminal Cases. The couri may admit the following evidence in a 
criminal case: 
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior, if offered 
to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, 
injury, or other physical evidence ... 
Fed. R. Evid. 412. Although the Federal Rule does not specifically state "physical 
injury," when read with the "or other physical evidence" portion, it is clear that the injury 
evidence is limited to physical injury evidence. However, there is no similar language in 
the Idaho Rule to provide such a limitation. As such, it was error for the district court to 
determine that "injury" was limited to pt1ysical injury evidence and to prohibit 
Mr. Orellana-Castro from providing testimony that another individual may have been the 
source of G.O.'s psychological injuries. Because the evidence fell under the I.R.E. 
412(b)(2)(A) exception, the presentation of the evidence should have been allowed. 
2. The Evidence That G.O.'s Psychological Injuries Were Caused By The 
Nonconsensual Contact \JVith Another Person Should Have Been Admitted 
Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. The right may be limited by I.R.E. 412. State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 722 
(Ct. App. 2003). A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence and even if the 
evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in certain cases. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 
814 (Ct. App. 1992). The state has a legitimate interest in protecting victims of sex 
crimes from unwarranted invasions of privacy and harassment regarding their sexual 
conduct. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991); Delaware v. 
VanArsda/1, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Admission of evidence of an alleged victim's 
past sexual behavior is constitutionally required only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Peite, 122 Idaho at 815. 
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The Idaho State Supreme Court has set forth a two-part inquiry to determine 
whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated by a trial court's exclusion 
of evidence under I.R.E. 412. Self, 139 Idaho at 722; Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-15. First, 
the trial court must consider whether the proffered evidence is relevant. Self, 139 Idaho 
at 722. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional right to present it. Id. If 
the evidence is relevant, the trial court must ask whether other legitimate interests 
outweigh the defendant's interest in presenting the evidence. Id. Because trial courts 
have such broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect or other concerns 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights will 
be violated only if the trial court abused its discretion. Id.; Peite, 122 Idaho at 815. 
In the case at hand, the district court found only that the evidence did not fall 
under the I.R.E. 412 exception, determined that without evidence of a physical injury the 
evidence had no relevancy and did not weigh the probative value against prejudicial 
effect. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the evidence is admissible under I.R.E. 
412(b )(2)(A) as discussed in section C( 1) above. He also asserts the evidence was 
relevant. 
The State presented several witnesses whose primary purpose was to provide 
evidence of the psychological injuries that were observed in G.O., the treatment that 
was necessary to address these issues, and the presumed cause of the injuries, that 
Mr. Orellana-Castro had sexually abused G.O. It is improper for the district court to 
allow this extensive testimony and assertions that Mr. Orellana-Castro's actions are the 
cause of these injuries to G.O. and then prohibit Mr. Orellana-Castro from presenting 
evidence that another trauma may have been the actual cause of G.O.'s psychological 
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issues. The evidence that Mr. Orellana-Castro sought to present supplied that G.O. had 
been involved in a nonconsensual sexual encounter with a man named Jose prior to 
receiving any of her evaluations or treatment and that this incident was the traumatic 
experience that cause her psychological issues. It was the State's actions in presenting 
this extensive testimony that created a situation where the evidence offered by 
Mr. Orellana-Castro became highly relevant. As such, this Court should find that the 
evidence is relevant. 
The district court did not engage in a balancing test of the probative value versus 
the prejudicial effect. Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the evidence that another 
individual caused G.O.'s psychological injuries is highly probative as to the ultimate 
issue of the trial - did Mr. Orellana-Castro have sexual contact with G.O. This is 
especially true in this case because this was a he said she said case where there was 
no physical injury or witnesses to the events. The State's presentation of several 
witnesses, including trained professionals, that believed G.O. had suffered trauma, 
creates a bolstering effect for G.O., a witness whose credibility was in question during 
trial. If the jury was presented with information that there was another, timely, sexual 
trauma, it may have had a significant impact on their determination of whether 
Mr. Orellana-Castro had sexual contact with G.O. 
On the other hand, there was little concern that the jury would be confused by the 
testimony as G.O.'s testimony about what had allegedly occurred with Mr. Orellana-
Castro was clear. Additionally, the evidence would not portray G.O. in an unfavorable 
light. It was not offered to show that she was promiscuous or harm her reputation, but 
show that she was a victim. As such, the probative value of the evidence outweighs 
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any potential prejudicial effect. Should this Court determine that it cannot determine 
whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, Mr. Orellana-Castro 
asserts that his case must be remanded for the district court to perform the balancing 
test. 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Orellana-Castro's motion to 
present evidence that there was a different source for G.O.'s psychological injury 
because the evidence was admissible under l.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A), it was relevant, and its 
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. As a result, the district court violated 
Mr. Orellana,-Castro's Sixth Amendment rights. 
IV. 
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Orellana-Castro's Fourteenth 
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of 
Errors Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were 
harmless, the district court's errors combined amount to cumulative error. The 
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by 
itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 
137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must 
first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then 
conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. 
Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when 
individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994 ). However, a 
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finding of cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. 
State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. Orellana-Castro asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to 
actual errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are 
found in sections I - Ill above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Orellana-Castro respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgments of 
conviction and remand his cases for a new trial. Additionally, he requests that upon 
remand his cases be severed and that the trials for the charges related to G.O. and 
S.O. proceed separately. Additionally, he requests that his judgments of conviction for 
Counts II and IV be vacated and remanded for a new trial in which Mr. Orellana-Castro 
will be able to present evidence that the nonconsensual sexual encounter with another 
man was the result of G.O.'s psychological injuries. 
DATED this th day of January, 2015. 
IZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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